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ONE LAST SHOT AT THE BYRD: SKF USA, INC. V. 
U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION SHOULD 
NOT FORECLOSE AS-APPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO THE BYRD AMENDMENT  
Jessica M. Forton+ 
Upon signing into law the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000 (CDSOA),1 President William J. Clinton cautioned,  
[T]his bill will provide select U.S. industries with a subsidy above 
and beyond the protection level needed to counteract foreign 
subsidies, while providing no comparable subsidy to other U.S. 
industries or to U.S. consumers, who are forced to pay higher prices 
on industrial inputs or consumer goods as a result of the  
anti-dumping and countervailing duties.  I call on the Congress to 
override this provision, or amend it to be acceptable, before they 
adjourn.2 
                     
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2006, The Catholic University of America.  The author wishes to thank Professor Rhett 
Ludwikowski for his invaluable assistance during the writing process.  The author would also like 
to thank her family and friends for their support, as well as the dedicated staff members of the 
Catholic University Law Review for their contributions to this Note. 
 1. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000), 
repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 154–55.  This Note 
uses various terms particular to international-trade law; thus, it is useful to provide initial 
definitions.  “Dumping” occurs when a foreign imported product is sold in the United States for 
less than the product’s fair value.  19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2006).  An “antidumping duty” is a tax 
levied on the product when imported to counter the effects of dumping.  See § 1673; BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1593 (9th ed. 2009).  A “countervailing duty” is a tax imposed on a foreign 
imported product to counter the effects of a foreign government subsidy.  See § 1671(a); BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 581.  A “subsidy” is a monetary benefit provided by a foreign 
government to the producer of the foreign imported product.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, 
at 1565; see also infra Part I.A.1 (providing a more thorough explanation of these terms). 
 2. Presidential Statement on Signing the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2001, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
2669, 2670 (Oct. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Presidential Statement].  The tone of President Clinton’s 
statement indicates the suspicious conditions under which CDSOA was enacted.  See JEANNE J. 
GRIMMETT & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33045, THE CONTINUED DUMPING 
AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT (“BYRD AMENDMENT”) 3 (2005) [hereinafter CRS REPORT, BYRD 
AMENDMENT].  In previous sessions of Congress, CDSOA legislation had been introduced but 
never made it out of committee.  Id.  Finally, Senator Robert Byrd—in his role as negotiator 
during conference negotiations—managed to slip the controversial legislation into the 
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2001.  Id.; see also 146 CONG. REC. 23,091 (2000) (statement of Sen. John 
McCain) (“[W]e should consider the effect of [CDSOA] very carefully.  Instead, we will not 
consider it at all.  No member, except those among the negotiators, will have any say about the 
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CDSOA—colloquially known as the Byrd Amendment3—is an obscure, yet 
controversial provision of U.S. international-trade law that has gone farther 
than any other remedial trade measure in protecting U.S. domestic industries 
against foreign competition.4  Reviled by critics both abroad and at home, the 
Byrd Amendment was struck down as a violation of U.S. international legal 
commitments,5 and now faces numerous constitutional challenges brought by 
adversely affected domestic companies.6  Plaintiffs who have filed suit have 
objected to the Byrd Amendment’s “affected domestic producer” provision, 
which conditions Byrd-money eligibility on whether the producer supported an 
                                                
effects of the policy.”).  Knowing that Congress and the President would have to reject the entire 
Agriculture Appropriations Bill to prevent CDSOA from passing, Senator Byrd helped to enact 
his amendment into law.  See Michael M. Phillips, Dumping Provision in Bill Puts Clinton at 
Odds with Union Voters Gore Needs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2000, at A2 (reporting that the 
Clinton Administration “can’t afford to veto the entire agriculture-funding bill” over CDSOA). 
 3. CDSOA is named after the late Senator Byrd of West Virginia, whose  
behind-the-scenes efforts were responsible for the statute’s enactment.  See CRS REPORT, BYRD 
AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 4. See id. at 2 (“Many find the measure controversial, therefore, because they believe that 
it adds a level of ‘protection’ on subject U.S. products in addition to the ameliorative action 
afforded by trade remedies.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-979, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING 
AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 3 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (“CDSOA operates differently 
from [other] trade remedies, such as AD/CV duties, which generally provide relief to all 
producers in an industry.”).  A survey of international-trade attorneys found that cases criticizing 
the Byrd Amendment were among the most influential trade cases of the decade because of the 
controversy surrounding the Amendment and Congress’s rare decision to repeal the law in 
response to a World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling.  Ryan Davis, International Trade Cases 
of the Decade, LAW 360 (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.law360.com/print_article/141720.  The 
WTO is an international organization that seeks to liberalize trade by providing a forum for its 
member states to negotiate agreements, and also provides a mechanism for settling trade disputes.  
WORLD TRADE ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 9 (2011), available at  
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf. 
 5. The WTO dispute, reportedly concerning a record number of co-complainants, involved 
eleven WTO members that successfully challenged the legality of the Byrd Amendment.  See 
Panel Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/R, 
WT/DS234/R (Sept. 16, 2002); see also CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 9.  
The United States has not yet fully complied with the WTO’s ruling to stop all distributions under 
the Byrd Amendment, and, as a result, the WTO authorized both the European Union and Japan 
to continue to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports.  EU Drastically Shrinks Byrd 
Amendment Retaliation to Three Products, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 29, 2011, at 3 (noting that 
EU retaliatory tariffs have dropped significantly from $95.83 million in 2010 to $9.96 million in 
2011, due to the drop in Byrd distributions); Japan To Extend, Reduce Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. 
Exports in Byrd Fight, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 12, 2011, at 12 (reporting that Japan’s 
retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports will fall from 4.1 to 1.7 percent in 2011). 
 6. See, e.g., SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1366 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2006) (upholding the equal-protection claim of plaintiff domestic producer who was denied 
Byrd Amendment distributions), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 
(SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Second Amended Complaint at 4, Giorgio Foods Inc. v. 
United States, No. 03-00286 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 7, 2011) (claiming that the Byrd Amendment 
violates the plaintiff domestic producer’s right to free speech). 
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antidumping or countervailing-duty order, thus excluding select domestic 
producers.7   
The United States currently enforces legislation designed to combat  
foreign-trade practices that negatively impact its domestic industries.8  Current 
domestic laws penalize the most common harmful practices—dumping and 
subsidization—by imposing antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) 
orders.9  An antidumping duty is assessed when a foreign product is imported 
and sold in the U.S. domestic market for less than its fair value—an occurrence 
referred to as dumping.10  A countervailing duty is assessed when a foreign 
producer receives monetary benefits—known as subsidies—from its 
government and the importation and sale of the subsidized product injures or 
threatens to injure the domestic industry.11  Both dumping and subsidization 
allow foreign producers to compete unfairly in the U.S. market to the detriment 
of domestic industries.12  
Members of a domestic industry threatened by dumping or subsidization can 
initiate an AD/CVD order by filing a petition with the appropriate government 
agencies.13  These agencies review the petition and conduct an investigation to 
verify the occurrence of dumping or subsidization, and determine whether the 
                     
 7. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2000), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 154–55 (2005) (defining an “affected domestic producer” as 
any producer that “(A) was a petitioner or interested party in support of the petition with respect 
to which an antidumping duty order . . . or a countervailing duty order has been entered, (B) and 
remains in operation” (emphasis added)).  Support under this provision must be indicated “by 
letter or through questionnaire response.” Id. § 1675c(d)(1). 
 8. VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32371, TRADE REMEDIES: A PRIMER 1 
(2008) [hereinafter CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES].  American trade laws are generally divided 
into two categories: (1) laws designed to combat unfair, or illegal foreign trade practices (e.g., 
dumping, subsidization, or breach of international agreements), and (2) laws designed to combat 
the effects of fair or legal foreign trade practices that may nonetheless distort competition and 
harm U.S. industries.  See id.  Measures combating these practices are generally consistent with 
U.S. obligations under various international trade agreements.  See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM 
J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
752–53 (5th ed. 2008) (explaining that WTO rules “have always permitted countries to take 
actions to offset injury caused by dumped and subsidized goods”). 
 9. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673 (2006). 
 10. Id. § 1673; see supra note 1; infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
 11. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a); see supra note 1; infra  notes 52–58 and accompanying text. 
 12. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 752 (noting that “the desire to create a level 
playing field” drives antidumping and countervailing-duty rules). 
 13. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(1), 1673a(b)(1).  Under U.S. law, the Department of Commerce 
(Commerce), the International Trade Commission (ITC), and Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) all play a role in investigating, issuing, and executing an AD/CVD order that allows for the 
imposition of duties on an imported product.  JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 763–66; see also 
infra Part I.A.1 (explaining the procedures for filing an AD/CVD petition). 
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practices affect a sufficient portion of the domestic industry.14  A positive 
determination results in issuance of an AD/CVD order that instructs Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP) to collect duties on the product at issue.15  
Domestic producers that file or support a successful AD/CVD petition receive 
payouts from the imposed duties under the Byrd Amendment.16   
Before the Byrd Amendment was enacted, monies collected from these 
duties went directly to the U.S. Treasury.17  Although the duties were 
substantial, they did not appear to discourage the targeted unfair trade 
practices.18  Thus, Congress passed the Byrd Amendment to provide monetary 
relief to those domestic producers that suffered harm both before and after the 
imposition of an AD/CVD order.19  Proponents of the Byrd Amendment 
believed the legislation would strengthen AD/CVD laws and ensure “that the 
remedial purpose of those laws [was] achieved.”20  Despite this noble 
intention, opponents believe the detrimental effect of the Byrd Amendment on 
domestic and foreign trade outweighs any possible benefits.21 
                     
 14. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(1)–(2), 1673(1)–(2); see also infra Part I.A.2 (providing an  
in-depth look at the ITC’s role in an injury assessment and explaining that the ITC determines 
which domestic producers are eligible for Byrd money). 
 15. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e. 
 16. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (“[D]uties assessed pursuant to a countervailing duty order [or] an 
antidumping duty order . . . shall be distributed on an annual basis . . . to the affected domestic 
producers for qualifying expenditures.  Such distribution shall be known as the ‘continued 
dumping and subsidy offset.’”); see also infra Part I.A.3.b (outlining procedures for obtaining a 
payout under the Byrd Amendment). 
 17. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.  Domestic producers only benefited from the 
monetary burden imposed on their foreign competition and the expectancy that those foreign 
producers would comply with U.S. trade law.  See id. at 6–7.  Compliance with AD/CVD laws 
following an order is generally measured within five years in a “sunset review,” in which 
Commerce and the ITC determine whether the harmful practice remains and whether it is still 
harming a sufficient scope of the domestic industry.  19 U.S.C. § 1675(c) (2006); see also GAO 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 6; U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, IMPORT INJURY INVESTIGATIONS CASE 
STATISTICS (FY 1980–2008) (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/documents 
/historical_case_stats.pdf (noting that half of 705 AD/CVD orders reviewed between the years 
1998–2008 were not revoked). 
 18. See 146 CONG. REC. 23,117 (2000) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd) (advocating for the 
Byrd Amendment and declaring that “[c]urrent law has simply not been strong enough to deter 
unfair trading practices”); see also U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 17, at tbl. 1 (providing 
statistical support for the notion that AD/CVD duties alone do not encourage compliance with 
AD/CVD laws); infra note 71 and accompanying text (explaining the ineffectiveness of AD/CVD 
orders). 
 19. See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X,  
§ 1002(3), 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72 (2000) (referring to “the continued dumping or 
subsidization of imported products after the issuance of” AD/CVD orders). 
 20. See id. § 1002(5), 114 Stat. at 1549A-73; see also 146 CONG. REC. 23,117 (statement of 
Sen. Robert Byrd) (“Now, such a mechanism will be in place . . . [for] workers . . . to recover 
monetarily rather than simply having the right to file a complaint.”). 
 21. See Presidential Statement, supra note 2, at 2670 (recommending that Congress repeal 
the Byrd Amendment because it would require consumers to face price increases on goods); Mark 
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In the most significant Byrd Amendment challenge to date, SKF USA, Inc. 
(SKF USA), a domestic producer of steel ball bearings, contested its 
ineligibility for Byrd benefits, while its eligible domestic competitors received 
millions in Byrd money.22  In 2006, SKF USA brought suit in the U.S. Court of 
International Trade (CIT), which held the Byrd Amendment unconstitutional 
because it denied SKF USA equal protection under the law.23  On appeal, a 
divided Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) reversed and upheld 
the Byrd Amendment’s constitutionality on free-speech and  
equal-protection grounds.24  The Supreme Court subsequently denied 
certiorari.25  Despite significant factual differences between the SKF plaintiffs 
and other Byrd Amendment challengers, the CAFC’s holding will likely 
dictate the outcome of future Byrd Amendment challenges.26   
                                                
R. Ludwikowski, More May Seek Byrd Payments, J. COM., Sept. 4, 2006, available at 
http://www.joc.com/more-may-seek-Byrd-payments (explaining how the Byrd Amendment hurts 
its intended beneficiaries).  A review of key statistics supports the contention that the Byrd 
Amendment operates favorably for only a few domestic producers.  See GAO REPORT, supra note 
4, at 28–29 (noting that Byrd payments are concentrated in a small number of businesses).  Byrd 
Amendment distributions totaled approximately $1 billion from fiscal years 2001 through 2004; 
yet, nearly half of that payment was distributed to only five eligible domestic producers.  Id.  
Timken, a ball bearings producer, received the largest individual payout—about twenty percent of 
the distributions, which totaled near $205 million.  Id. 
 22. See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1356 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2006) (noting that SKF USA’s domestic competitor, Timken U.S. Corporation, named as a 
defendant-intervenor, has received millions in Byrd money), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. 
U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also supra note 21 
(detailing how Timken has received the majority of all payouts under the Byrd Amendment 
across all industries). 
 23. SKF I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.  U.S. law bestows the CIT, a specialized federal court, 
with jurisdiction to hear all trade-related matters.  See 28 U.S.C § 1581 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
 24. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360.  Decisions of the CIT are directly appealable to the CAFC, 
which the Supreme Court can ultimately review.  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2006); JACKSON ET 
AL., supra note 8, at 120.  Byrd Amendment challenges in the CIT have been mostly successful; 
however, the CAFC has reversed the majority of these judgments.  See, e.g., SKF II, 556 F.3d at 
1360; PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2008-1526, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 22584, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2010), rev’d 558 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008). 
 25. SKF USA, Inc. v. Customs & Border Prot., 130 S. Ct. 3273 (2010).  Traditionally, the 
Supreme Court has been extremely hesitant to hear trade-related cases, which leaves the CAFC’s 
opinions as controlling authority in most of these cases.  See Ryan Davis, High Court Takes on 
First Anti-Dumping Case, LAW 360 (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.law360.com/web/artciles/75562 
(noting that the Supreme Court only recently took on its first dumping case); see also United 
States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 308 (2009) (upholding the Commerce Department’s 
interpretation of the antidumping statute to treat “low enriched uranium” as a good, rather than a 
service, thus subjecting it to duties). 
 26. See PS Chez Sidney, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22584, at *3 (“SKF . . . control[s] with 
regard to all constitutional issues presented . . . .”).  Although PS Chez Sidney is marked as 
“UNPUBLISHED OR NONPRECEDENTIAL AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENT,” 
a circuit court may not restrict its citation except to limit its use as persuasive precedent.  See id. 
at *1; see also FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a). 
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Bowing to international and domestic pressures, Congress repealed the Byrd 
Amendment in 2006,27 while leaving certain provisions effective for successful 
claims made before October 1, 2007.28  Although Congress limited payout 
claims to a six-year period from October 2001 to October 2007,29 a claims 
backlog has left approximately $1 billion in funds yet to be distributed.30  This 
backlog resulted mainly because domestic producers seeking their fair share of 
Byrd money brought numerous legal challenges to the Byrd Amendment’s 
validity, and these challenges were stayed pending the outcome of SKF and 
other test cases.31  Many of the plaintiffs in these cases rely on the argument 
that to give only those producers that supported the original petition a 
monetary benefit while considering ineligible other producers that have 
similarly been affected by the foreign practice, but that did not support the 
petition, violates equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.32  
Unfortunately, the CAFC’s holding in SKF and the Supreme Court’s 
                     
 27. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154 
(repealing 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000)). 
 28. Id. § 7601(b). 
 29. Compare Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X,  
§ 1003(c), 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-75 (2000) (“The amendments made by this section shall apply 
with respect to all antidumping and countervailing duty assessments made on or after October 1, 
2000.”), with Deficit Reduction Act § 7601(b) (“All duties on entries of goods made and filed 
before October 1, 2007 . . . shall be distributed.”). 
 30. Nick Brown, SKF Looks to High Court to Nullify Byrd Amendment, LAW 360 (Feb. 12, 
2010), http://www/law360.com/print_article/149488; see also infra notes 60–61 and 
accompanying text (describing how potential Byrd payments reached $1 billion). 
 31. Supreme Court Declines to Review Ruling in Byrd Amendment Case, INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE, May 21, 2010, at 10.  For a listing of over thirty cases that were stayed pending other 
Byrd challenges, see Letter from Gregory W. Carman, Judge, U.S. Court of Int’l Trade, to 
Counsel, Consol. Ct. No. 06-00290, et al. (Feb. 10, 2011) (on file with the CIT). 
 32. See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1363, 1366 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2006) (holding the Byrd Amendment unconstitutional under  an equal-protection analysis), 
rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009).  Claims of equal protection are not a new phenomenon in international-trade law.  See 
Todd M. Hughes & Claudia Burke, Constitutional Litigation and Its Jurisdictional Implications 
in the Court of International Trade, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 541 (2009) (finding that 
constitutional issues, including equal-protection challenges, have “played a small but vital role” 
in international-trade litigation).  However, the Byrd Amendment has created an interesting 
opportunity for domestic producers to make such a claim.  See id. at 551–52.  Previous  
equal-protection claims in trade law mostly stemmed from the tariff rates assigned to certain 
products over others.  See, e.g., Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (rejecting an equal-protection challenge to tariff rates for men’s gloves and finding a 
lack of discriminatory intent).  Another constitutional argument against the Byrd Amendment is 
based on the First Amendment right to free speech, and asserts that the government practices 
viewpoint discrimination by denying monetary benefits based solely on publicly expressed 
opposition to a governmental investigation during the course of an AD/CVD proceeding.  See 
SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360 (rejecting SKF USA’s claim and upholding the Byrd Amendment as 
constitutional under the First Amendment right to free speech). 
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subsequent denial of certiorari appear to foreclose such claims by current and 
future Byrd Amendment challengers.33   
However, because SKF and the other major Byrd Amendment cases only 
reviewed the law’s facial constitutionality,34 plaintiffs with strong factual cases 
argue that the Byrd Amendment should be deemed unconstitutional as applied 
to their individual circumstances.35  For example, United Synthetics, Inc., a 
domestic producer of polyester staple fiber, did not exist at the time its 
domestic industry filed a petition with the government, and thus had no 
opportunity to show its support.36  Giorgio Foods, Inc., a domestic producer of 
preserved mushrooms, took numerous actions to support its industry’s petition, 
but did not produce a formal expression of support.37  These cases require  
as-applied adjudication, which the Supreme Court increasingly prefers in 
individual-rights litigation, rather than review based on facial validity.38  
Furthermore, the Court has upheld as-applied challenges when a facial 
challenge has failed.39  
Given this recent activity in the courts, the constitutionality of the Byrd 
Amendment must be reevaluated.40 This Note argues that SKF should not 
foreclose the claims of other Byrd Amendment challengers; rather, the CIT and 
the CAFC should newly review the constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment 
                     
 33. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360; see also Supreme Court Declines to Review Ruling in Byrd 
Amendment Case, supra note 31, at 10 (stating that SKF was the test case for the nearly fifty 
similar Byrd Amendment cases). 
 34. See, e.g., SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1349–50; Pat Huval Rest. & Oyster Bar Inc. v. United 
States, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1365 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2008) (per curiam) (describing plaintiff 
domestic producers’ claims as “facial constitutional challenges” to the Byrd Amendment). 
 35. See infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text; see also Shrimp Producers Raise 
Constitutional Claims on Application of Byrd Law, INT’L TRADE DAILY, June 10, 2011 (noting 
that plaintiffs in Tampa Bay Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 2012 WL 934098,  distinguished 
their claims from SKF by “argu[ing] that its constitutional claims are ‘fundamentally different’ 
from those rejected in the SKF decision”). 
 36. Amended Complaint at 7, United Synthetics, Inc. v. United States, No. 08-00139 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade Feb. 1, 2011). 
 37. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8–18. 
 38. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 39. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (noting that as-applied 
challenges were “the proper means to consider exceptions,” even in situations when “facial 
attacks should not have been entertained in the first instance”). 
 40. Though repealed, the Byrd Amendment remains relevant as indicated by 
communications from Congress and other government representatives, emphasizing the law’s 
international-trade implications and its impact on constitutional issues.  See, e.g., Draft Senate 
Letter on Byrd Amendment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 4, 2008, at 15 (asking Senate colleagues to 
support the reinstatement of the Byrd Amendment); Highlights From Written Responses by USTR 
Nominee Ron Kirk, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 13, 2009, at 7 (reporting that current U.S. Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk pledged to “formulate an administration position on reintroducing the 
Byrd Amendment”); New Senate Finance Committee Features More Pro-Trade Dems, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE, Jan. 16, 2009, at 15 (commenting that two of the three pro-trade Democratic 
members of the Senate Finance Committee voted for the Byrd Amendment). 
572 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 61:565 
as applied to each plaintiff.41  Part I.A provides a general background on the 
procedures for bringing an AD/CVD order, specifically focusing on the role of 
the International Trade Commission (ITC) in making an injury determination.  
This Part also analyzes the Byrd Amendment, and examines the support 
requirement of the controversial affected-domestic-producer provision.  Part 
I.B reviews relevant Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection jurisprudence 
and discusses the Supreme Court’s increasing preference for as-applied 
constitutional challenges.  Part II discusses SKF USA Inc. v. United States, in 
which the CAFC ultimately upheld the Byrd Amendment as constitutional 
under free-speech and equal-protection analyses.  Part II also examines 
differing court opinions regarding the Byrd Amendment’s constitutionality and 
outlines the significant differences between the plaintiffs in SKF and other 
Byrd Amendment challengers.  Part III argues that, in light of recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, SKF should not control other as-applied challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment.  Part III further analyzes how 
upcoming cases could serve as vehicles for sustaining a successful as-applied 
equal-protection claim against the Byrd Amendment.  Finally, Part IV 
concludes and reiterates that courts should not be bound by previous rulings on 
the Byrd Amendment’s facial validity, as determined in SKF because a court 
that conducts an as-applied challenge must consider a plaintiff’s particular 
situation, and therefore could find the Byrd Amendment to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.  
I.  THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND ISSUES SURROUNDING ITS 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
A.  Relevant Provisions of U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing-Duty Laws 
Applicable to the Byrd Amendment42 
1.  General Purposes and Brief Overview of U.S. Antidumping and 
Countervailing-Duty Laws  
U.S. AD/CVD laws seek to “create a level playing field” for domestic 
industries by combating the unfair trade practice known as dumping and 
subsidization through the imposition of antidumping and countervailing 
                     
 41. See infra Part III.  Generally, constitutional challenges to laws occur through either  
as-applied or facial challenges.  Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 
18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010).  A facial constitutional challenge involves “a 
head-on attack on the legislative judgment, an assertion that the challenged statute violates the 
Constitution in all, or virtually all, of its applications.”  United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 
1171 (10th Cir. 2007).  In contrast, an as-applied constitutional challenge “concedes that the 
statute may be constitutional in many of its applications, but contends that it is not so under the 
particular circumstances of the case.”  Id. 
 42. This section seeks to provide only a basic introduction to the U.S. AD/CVD laws that 
have implications for a Byrd Amendment analysis.  For a more thorough discussion of trade law, 
see CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES supra note 8, at 1. 
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duties.43  Domestic law and international agreements regulate dumping and 
subsidization;44 under U.S. law, a domestic industry affected by these practices 
can initiate an AD/CVD investigation by filing a petition with Commerce and 
the ITC.45  The petitioner—usually a U.S. domestic producer or group of 
producers—must allege that its industry is being unduly harmed as a result of 
dumping or subsidization.46    
Dumping occurs when a foreign producer imports and sells its product on 
the U.S. market for “less than fair value”:  a lower price than what the product 
would sell for in its domestic market.47  Under U.S. law, Commerce must 
determine if there is a material difference between these two prices, known as 
a “dumping margin.”48  If Commerce determines that a dumping margin exists, 
and the ITC finds that there is a material injury (or threat thereof)49 to the 
domestic industry as a result of this dumping margin, an antidumping duty will 
be imposed on the merchandise.50  When issuing an antidumping order, 
                     
 43. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 752 (discussing unfair trade regulations); see also 19 
U.S.C. § 1671 (2006) (countervailing-duty laws); id.  § 1673 (antidumping laws). 
 44. See CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES, supra note 8, at 3–5 (detailing how AD/CVD 
investigations and remedial actions gain their statutory authority from the Tariff Act of 1930 as 
amended, and are discussed in international agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and the North American Free Trade Agreement); see also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 
8, at 752–53. 
 45. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b)(1)–(2), 1673a(b)(1)–(2) (outlining the procedure for initiating 
petitions and by filing with the administrative authority and the Commission, which are defined 
by 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1)–(2) as the Secretary of Commerce and the International Trade 
Commission respectively).  Alternatively, if Commerce believes that dumping or subsidization is 
occurring, it may bring an investigation of its own volition.  Id. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a)(1). 
 46. Id. § 1677(9)(C)–(G) (defining an “interested party” for purposes of filing an AD/CVD 
petition). 
 47. See id. § 1677(34) (“The terms ‘dumped’ and ‘dumping’ refer to the sale or likely sale 
of goods at less than fair value.”).  Determining whether a product is sold at less than fair value 
begins by calculating the price of the good in the foreign producer’s home market—the “normal 
value”—and comparing that to the price the foreign producer sells the good for in the U.S. 
market—the “export price.”  Id. §§ 1677a(a), 1677b(a).  If the actual figures are unavailable 
(because, for instance, the good may not be sold in the foreign producer’s home market, or the 
good may be sold in the United States through an affiliate), then a constructed normal value and 
export price will be used.  Id. §§ 1677a(b), 1677b(a)(4).  Additionally, a complex system of 
adjustments must be made to each figure to account for any differences in how the two products 
are produced and sold.  Id. § 1677a(c)-(d), 1677b(a)(6)-(8); see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8,  
at 770. 
 48. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (explaining that Commerce determines if foreign merchandise “is 
being, or likely to be, sold in the United States for less than its fair value”); id. § 1677(35)(A) 
(defining “dumping margin” as “the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export 
price”). 
 49. Id. § 1677(7)(A) (defining “material injury” as “harm which is not inconsequential, 
immaterial, or unimportant”). 
 50. Id. § 1673.  Throughout the investigative process, Commerce and the ITC must adhere 
to strict deadlines when making their respective determinations.  See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 
8, at 764–65 (providing an overview of the differing timetables for completing an AD/CVD 
investigation). 
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Commerce instructs CBP to collect duties on the incoming goods it determines 
to be injurious.51   
Countervailing-duty laws, on the other hand, are aimed at combating certain 
subsidies52 that foreign governments provide to their domestic producers that 
export products into the U.S. market.53  By accepting a subsidy, the foreign 
producer can sell its product at a lower price on the U.S. market, thereby 
distorting fair competition.54  Under U.S. law, certain subsidies are considered 
countervailable and subject to duties that attempt to neutralize their negative 
effect on the market.55  Similar to an antidumping investigation, Commerce 
must determine that subsidization is occurring in the subject industry,56 and the 
ITC must also determine that the subsidization has caused a material injury or 
threat of material injury to the U.S. domestic industry.57  If both of these 
conditions are met, then Commerce will issue a countervailing-duty order 
instructing CBP to collect duties on the import in question.58   
The AD/CVD order instructs CBP to collect duties on the product when it 
enters the United States in an amount sufficient to counteract the level of 
dumping or subsidization.59  These initial duties are estimates; final duty 
assessments are completed a few years after the initial collection.60  Final duty 
assessments are further prolonged if the AD/CVD order becomes the subject of 
                     
 51. 19 U.S.C. § 1673e. 
 52. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 848 (explaining the difference between 
“‘legitimate government’ activities” and “trade-distorting subsidies”).  These trade-distorting 
subsidies are divided into domestic subsidies and export subsidies.  Id.  A “domestic subsidy is 
granted to an industry on all of its production of a product, regardless of whether that product[] is 
exported.”  Id.  By contrast, “an export subsidy . . . is paid to an industry only on products that are 
exported.”  Id. at 849.  Under U.S. law, certain domestic and export subsidies are considered 
“countervailable subsidies,” and are thus subject to duties.  Id. at 848–49. 
 53. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
 54. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 849 (noting that both domestic and export subsidies 
“can distort resource allocation by inducing production and exportation that is otherwise 
uneconomic”). 
 55. Id. at 848–49. 
 56. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
 57. Id.; see CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES supra note 8, at 4–5 (explaining that unless the 
subsidy has been addressed by a trade agreement, any threat of material injury is sufficient). 
 58. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e. 
 59. Id. (“[Commerce] shall publish a countervailing duty order which—(1) directs customs 
officers to assess a countervailing duty equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy 
determined or estimated to exist . . . .”); id. § 1673e(a)(1) (“[Commerce] shall publish an 
antidumping duty order which—(1) directs customs officers to assess an antidumping duty equal 
to the amount by which the normal value of the merchandise exceeds the export price . . . .”). 
 60. See CRS REPORT, TRADE REMEDIES, supra note 8, at 10–11 (providing an overview of 
different reviews of an order that may prolong final duty assessment); GAO REPORT, supra note 
4, at 25 (describing the process of liquidation, which is a term used to describe the making of a 
final duty assessment). 
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litigation.61  As a result, an estimated $1 billion in Byrd Amendment funds 
awaits distribution.62 
2.  Defining the Scope of the Industry Affected: A Closer Look at the ITC’s 
Role in an AD/CVD Investigation  
As noted above, the ITC must “define the scope of the industry that is 
affected by competition from imported goods and . . . determine whether the 
industry has suffered or been threatened with material injury as a result of 
dumped or subsidized imports.”63  As part of this determination, the ITC relies 
on AD/CVD petitions and questionnaires sent to potentially affected members 
of the domestic industry asking if they support, oppose, or take no position on 
the petition.64  These surveys are taken throughout the course of an AD/CVD 
investigation and do not always reach every member of an industry.65  The ITC 
may also rely on letters of support from domestic producers that did not 
receive a questionnaire, but that desire to take a position on the matter 
formally.66  
Ideally, every member of a domestic industry would have an opportunity to 
express their support for the petition; however, this is not always the case and 
is not necessarily relevant when the determination is not intended to discern 
whether each domestic producer was injured by the dumping or 
subsidization.67 Rather, the ITC seeks a representative portion of petition 
supporters to determine whether sufficient data exist for an investigation to 
proceed.68  Determining the scope of the affected industry also helps determine 
                     
 61. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 25. 
 62. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 63. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11 (emphasis added); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) 
(describing the role of the ITC in a countervailing-duty investigation); § 1673(2) (describing the 
role of the ITC in an antidumping investigation). 
 64. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12; see also 19 C.F.R. § 207.8 (2011) (describing 
ITC regulations on the issuance of questionnaires in connection with an ongoing AD/CVD 
investigation).  A domestic producer often has several reasons why it may choose either to oppose 
or to take no position on an AD/CVD petition.  See CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra 
note 2, at 20–21 (highlighting that, among other issues, producers may question the effectiveness 
of AD/CVD orders and find supporting petitions to be too costly, or not in the best interest of 
their businesses). 
 65. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 66. Id. at 12 (noting that producers may indicate support via a letter); see also 19 C.F.R.  
§ 207.26 (describing permissible brief, voluntary statements submitted by nonparties in an 
ongoing AD/CVD investigation). 
 67. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 11–12 (finding that the ITC “generally strive[s] to 
cover 100 percent of [an] industry” but occasionally “surveys a sample of U.S. producers instead 
of the entire industry . . . account[ing] for 10 percent or less of production” (internal footnote 
omitted)). 
 68. Id. (“[T]he ITC’s investigative process does not result in collecting information from all 
industry participants, because it is intended for purposes other than CDSOA.”). 
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whether an individual producer qualifies as an “affected domestic producer” 
for purposes of the Byrd Amendment payouts.69  
3.  The Byrd Amendment: Providing Relief to a Continuously Injured 
Domestic Industry  
Although Congress had established trade laws years before, these measures 
were not having the expected curative effect on unfair foreign trading 
practices.70  The Byrd Amendment was enacted (1) to strengthen the remedial 
nature of previous AD/CVD laws, (2) bring about fair trade conditions, and (3) 
help domestic producers combat unfair foreign trade practices.71  To 
accomplish these ends, Congress intended Byrd Amendment payouts to 
compensate producers for losses due to dumping and subsidization that 
occurred before and after the enactment of an AD/CVD order. 72     
Following the Byrd Amendment’s contentious enactment,73 critics from 
several policy areas called for a repeal, arguing that the provision was 
unnecessary, costly, and unfairly benefited only those producers that fit the 
narrow requirement of the “affected domestic producer” at the expense of their 
competitors, both foreign and domestic.74  These select few producers would 
                     
 69. See id. (explaining that CDSOA eligibility is linked to the ITC’s process of determining 
domestic-industry harm during AD/CVD investigations). 
 70. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 784.  There are several reasons why these 
measures were ineffective.  Foreign producers discovered ways to get around AD/CVD orders as 
they were levied by either failing to pay duties or making slight adjustments to their importing 
routines.  Id.  Some foreign producers also found paying AD/CVD duties more cost effective than 
changing their business practices.  144 CONG. REC. 14,962 (1998) (statement of Sen. Michael 
DeWine).  Furthermore, foreign countries accused of subsidizing would create new ways to 
maintain benefits for their producers.  Id.  Combined, these maneuvers continued to harm the U.S. 
domestic industries that had successfully lobbied for AD/CVD orders against their foreign 
competition.  Id. 
 71. GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (summarizing these three specific purposes); see 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, Pub. L. No. 106-387, title X § 1002(3) 114 Stat. 
1549, 1549A-72 (2000). 
 72. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, § 1002(3) (discussing the harmful effects 
of dumping and subsidization before and after AD/CVD orders).  In support of his Amendment, 
Senator Byrd argued that although domestic producers had “legal remedies to challenge foreign 
actions . . . [they did not have] adequate means to recover from the losses resulting from those 
actions.”  146 CONG. REC. 23,117 (2000) (statement of Sen. Robert Byrd).  Senator Michael 
DeWine, the original sponsor of CDSOA, argued that this new measure would “compensate for 
damages” and effectively “discourage foreign companies from dumping and subsidization, since 
it would actually assist U.S. competitors at their expense.”  144 CONG. REC. 14,962 (statement of 
Sen. Michael DeWine). 
 73. CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that it was enacted 
“without committee or floor amendment in either House”); see also supra note 2 (providing 
background on the Byrd Amendment’s troubled history). 
 74. See 146 CONG. REC. 23,092 (2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain) (voicing concern 
with the government’s spending on the Byrd Amendment during a floor debate); GAO REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 44–45 (explaining how the Byrd Amendment works only to benefit a limited 
number of domestic producers while harming other domestic producers); Presidential Statement, 
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essentially receive a double benefit—the additional Byrd money and an 
advantage over their competition.75  
a.  The Byrd Amendment’s Affected-Domestic-Producer Provision 
The Byrd Amendment requires the ITC to compose an annual list of affected 
domestic producers for existing AD/CVD orders to send to CBP for Byrd 
distribution issuance.76  The Byrd Amendment defines “affected domestic 
producer” as any producer that “was a petitioner or interested party in support 
of the petition with respect to which an antidumping duty order . . . or a 
countervailing duty order has been entered and . . . remains in operation.”77  
This support can be demonstrated “by letter or through questionnaire response” 
to the ITC during the original investigation.78  Thus, the only domestic 
producers considered affected domestic producers eligible for Byrd 
Amendment distribution are those that filed the petition and have demonstrated 
their support for the petition during the original investigation.79   
Conversely, the producers that checked “no position” or “oppose” on the 
original petition questionnaires are ineligible for Byrd Amendment payouts.80  
The exclusion also applies to companies that did not send petition-support 
letters, and those that would have supported the petition but did not have 
knowledge of the pending investigation.81  This provision similarly excludes 
                                                
supra note 2, at 2670 (expressing opposition to the Byrd Amendment’s selective and excessive 
subsidies). 
 75. 114 CONG. REC. 14,962 (statement of Sen. Michael DeWine) (noting that CDSOA 
payouts gave producers a “double-hit” over foreign producers by subsidizing domestic products 
and discouraging foreign dumping); see also CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT, supra note 2, at 
2 (“[M]any . . . believe that it adds a level of ‘protection’ on subject U.S. products in addition to 
the ameliorative action afforded by [prior] trade remedies.”). 
 76. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C.  
§ 1675c(d)(1), (3) (2000), repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171,  
§ 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154–55. 
 77. Id. § 1675c(b)(1). 
 78. Id. § 1675c(d)(1); see also supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text (providing the 
ITC’s procedures for questionnaires and letters of support during the original investigation).  In 
some instances, those producers that supported an active AD/CVD order by making appearances 
at sunset reviews may also be eligible. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(1); see also supra note 17 (providing 
a short description of sunset reviews). 
 79. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1). 
 80. See, e.g., SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337, 
1343, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (determining that SKF USA, a domestic producer who checked the 
“no support” box on the original petition, was correctly denied Byrd Amendment funds); PS Chez 
Sidney, L.L.C v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331, 1333 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2006) (declaring the Byrd Amendment as applied to PS Chez Sidney, a domestic producer who 
checked the “take no position” box on the original petition, unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment’s right to free speech), rev’d, 409 Fed. App’x 327, 329 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (overturning 
the CIT and upholding the Byrd Amendment as constitutional under the First Amendment). 
 81. Frequently Asked Questions: Byrd Amendment/CDSOA, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N 
(Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/byrd_amendment.htm. 
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domestic companies that began production after the initial investigation, and 
did not have an opportunity to show support for the petition.82 
b.  Procedures for Obtaining a Byrd Amendment Payout  
Under the Byrd Amendment, the Commissioner of CBP is responsible for 
providing annual fund distributions received under AD/CVD orders to affected 
domestic producers.83  Before making distributions, CBP is required to deposit 
all collected AD/CVD duties into special accounts.84  Upon receipt of the 
ITC’s yearly list of affected domestic producers, CBP publishes in the Federal 
Register the list of affected domestic producers eligible to receive payouts.85  
Once this list is published, eligible parties must certify the following: their 
want of distributions; their eligibility as an affected domestic producer; and 
their qualifying expenditures.86  Distributions under the Byrd Amendment are 
made to qualifying producers “on a pro rata basis,” meaning the more a 
producer claims under qualifying expenditures, the more they are eligible to 
receive.87  CBP then distributes the funds from the special accounts to affected 
domestic producers for their claimed qualifying expenditures.88  Because of the 
Byrd Amendment’s 2006 repeal, only those claims made between 2001 and 
2007 are eligible for Byrd distributions.89  
B.  Relevant Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Equal Protection, Rational-Basis 
Review, and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges  
1.  Overview of Equal-Protection Challenges Under Rational-Basis Review 
One of the myriad of challenges to the Byrd Amendment asserts that the 
Amendment violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by 
awarding payouts to select domestic producers, while denying compensation to 
                     
 82. See GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (“[A]s a result [of the affected domestic producer 
provision], a number of U.S. companies, such as those that began production after orders 
covering their products came into effect, are ineligible.”); see also, Amended Complaint, supra 
note 36, at 7. 
 83. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(3); see also CRS REPORT, BYRD AMENDMENT supra note 2, at  
3–4 (explaining the CDSOA fund distribution process). 
 84. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(e). 
 85. Id. § 1675c(c)–(d)(3). 
 86. Id. § 1675c(d)(2); see id. § 1675c(b)(4) (defining “qualifying expenditure” as any 
“expenditure incurred after the issuance of the antidumping duty finding or order or 
countervailing duty order . . . .”). 
 87. Id. § 1675c(d)(3); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 16 (“CDSOA uses a pro rata 
formula to allocate disbursements under a given order among the eligible companies filing 
claims, with percentages determined according to the claims of qualifying expenditures  
submitted. . . . This pro rata formula creates an incentive for producers to claim as many 
expenses as possible relative to other producers so that their share of the funds available under an 
order is as large as possible.”). 
 88. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(d)(3), (e)(1). 
 89. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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other similarly situated domestic producers.90  The Fourteenth Amendment 
declares that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”91  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to mean that the 
law should treat all similarly situated persons alike.92  Depending on what is at 
issue, equal-protection claims are subject to either a strict form of scrutiny, an 
intermediate form of scrutiny, or a rational-basis form of scrutiny.93  Generally, 
the inquiry is the same for all three standards: is the law’s classification or 
discrimination justified by some sufficient government purpose?94 
a.  Equal-Protection Cases Requiring a Heightened Standard of Scrutiny: 
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications 
The Supreme Court has identified two types of cases in which a law violates 
the Equal Protection Clause under a heightened standard of review: when it 
threatens (1) the protection of fundamental rights,95 and (2) the protection of 
the rights of those who fall within suspect classifications.96  Under strict 
                     
 90. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1363 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 
(1954) (holding that the federal government is also subject to equal-protection requirements under 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause). 
 92. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
 93. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671–72 
(3d ed. 2006) (briefly describing strict, intermediate, and rational-basis review). 
 94. Id. at 673. 
 95. Fundamental rights include any enumerated right expressly guaranteed within the text of 
the Constitution—including freedom of speech—and certain unenumerated rights, such as the 
right to privacy in family planning.  See CHEMERINSKY supra note 93, at 675–76, 792 (discussing 
“liberties . . . so important that they are deemed to be ‘fundamental rights’”); see also United 
States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (outlining an elevated level of review 
that courts can apply to laws that infringe on constitutional rights). 
 96. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding racially based 
school segregation unconstitutional under the auspices of equal protection); see also Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (using a strict-scrutiny analysis to hold a state law that 
denied welfare benefits on the basis of national origin unconstitutional under equal-protection 
jurisprudence).  Courts analyze gender classifications under an intermediate standard of scrutiny.  
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that the Virginia Military 
Institute failed to demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its male-only 
admissions policy).  Beyond these few suspect classes, the Supreme Court has refused to extend a 
heightened standard of scrutiny to other classifications.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
635 (1996) (declaring that a Colorado constitutional amendment violated the equal protection 
guarantee by excluding homosexuals from protection, but refusing to declare homosexuals a 
suspect class); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 450 (1985) (refusing to find 
the mentally handicapped a suspect class, but nevertheless invalidating a law that precluded 
establishment of a group home for the mentally handicapped); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 
U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (ruling that age discrimination was not a violation of the Equal Protection 
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scrutiny—the most rigorous standard—laws must be narrowly tailored to fulfill 
a compelling government interest, and use the least restrictive means to 
accomplish that end.97  Under the less stringent intermediate-scrutiny standard, 
there must be a substantial relation between the law and an important 
government interest.98  Under both of these standards, the government bears 
the burden of proof.99 
b.  Rational-Basis Standard Under the Equal-Protection Clause: 
Presumption of Constitutionality 
If a statute accused of violating the Equal Protection Clause does not 
infringe on a fundamental right, or discriminate against a member of a suspect 
class, then a court will employ a rational-basis standard of scrutiny.100  Under 
this standard, courts must determine whether the alleged discriminatory effect 
of the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.101  Courts 
may accept any conceivable purpose for the law, which does not confine the 
inquiry solely to legislative text, history, or intent.102  The challenger of the 
law, not the government, bears the burden of proof.103   
The Supreme Court has also implicitly conducted rational-basis review for 
legislation specifically involving social or economic issues.104  Furthermore, 
the Court has construed a constitutional presumption that, “absent some reason 
to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by 
the democratic process” under a rational-basis review.105  With such a low 
standard for the government to meet, the Supreme Court will generally uphold 
a statute as not violating equal protection under rational-basis review.106   
                                                
Clause under a rational-basis review); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532–33 
(1973) (ruling that discrimination based on financial status was a violation of equal protection 
under rational-basis review). 
 97. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (applying the strict-scrutiny standard to 
racially based discrimination); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 541. 
 98. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying the intermediate-scrutiny standard 
to gender-based discrimination). 
 99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 541–42. 
 100. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a 
suspect class . . . [it will be upheld] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate 
end.”). 
 101. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (using rational-basis review). 
 102. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (“[A] statutory discrimination will 
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”). 
 103. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (“The burden is on the one attacking 
the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 104. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 105. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
 106. See FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (describing rational basis 
as “a paradigm of judicial restraint”). 
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However, a presumption favoring constitutionality does not render a 
rational-basis inquiry completely moot.  On numerous occasions the Supreme 
Court has found it appropriate to strike down a law using this standard.107  In 
these circumstances, the Court found either a lack of legitimate government 
purpose behind the legislation, or determined that the classification made was 
not “reasonable in light of its purpose.”108  Stated another way, a court can 
strike down a law under rational-basis review if the law is “clearly wrong, a 
display of arbitrary power, [or] not an exercise of judgment.”109 
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court determined 
that no legitimate government interest was served by enacting legislation that 
promoted wealth discrimination.110  In so doing, the Court held 
unconstitutional a 1971 amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which 
denied households that included unrelated individuals eligibility to the 
assistance program.111  The Court found that this particular amended statutory 
classification was “clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act.”112  The 
Court searched for any other purported government interest that could justify 
the discriminatory classification, but found none; therefore, the Court held the 
amended provision unconstitutional under rational-basis review.113   
2.  Judicial Preference for As-Applied Constitutional Challenges in 
Individual-Rights Litigation 
a.  Facial and As-Applied Constitutional Challenges 
Generally, plaintiffs may challenge a law’s constitutionality in two distinct 
ways: by challenging the validity of the law on its face, or by challenging the 
validity of the law as applied to that plaintiff’s individual circumstance.114  The 
                     
 107. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 635 (1996) (finding that an amendment to 
the Colorado constitution prohibiting specialized state protection for homosexuals was 
unconstitutional under rational-basis scrutiny because it was “[a] law declaring that in general it 
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the 
government”); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446, 450 (holding that a city zoning ordinance requiring a 
special-use permit to establish a group home for the mentally challenged was unconstitutional 
under rational-basis scrutiny, and explaining that “[t]he State may not rely on a classification 
whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or 
irrational”); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 108. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
 109. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
619, 640 (1937)). 
 110. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 111. Id. at 529, 538. 
 112. Id. at 534. 
 113. Id. at 534–35. 
 114. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 236 (1994) (providing a conventional summary of as-applied versus facial constitutional 
challenges); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
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classic formulation of a facial challenge appears in United States v. Salerno, in 
which then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated “[a] facial challenge to a 
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, 
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under 
which the Act would be valid.”115  An as-applied challenge, on the other hand, 
“concedes that the statute may be constitutional in many of its applications, but 
contends that it is not so under the particular circumstances of the case.”116  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its preference for as-applied 
challenges, which it calls “the basic building block[] of constitutional 
adjudication.”117  This preference flows from the constitutional requirement 
that courts only adjudicate those cases and controversies as they are properly 
presented to the court, and that courts do not unnecessarily invalidate 
legislation that has not been sufficiently challenged.118     
b.  The Roberts Supreme Court’s Trend Toward As-Applied Constitutional 
Challenges in Individual-Rights Litigation 
One of the hallmarks of Supreme Court jurisprudence under Chief Justice 
John Roberts’ Court is an increasing preference for as-applied over facial 
constitutional challenges, especially in the context of individual-rights 
litigation.119  The Roberts Court has exercised this trend in the context of 
                                                
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000) (providing a seminal account of facial and as-applied 
challenges); Kreit, supra note 41, at 657. 
 115. 481 U.S. 739, 745, 751 (1987) (holding that the challenged portion of the Bail Reform 
Act survived a facial constitutional attack), rev’d on other grounds, 505 U.S. 317 (1992); see also 
United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 2007) (McConnell, J., concurring) 
(defining a facial challenge as “a head-on attack on the legislative judgment, an assertion that the 
challenged statute violates the Constitution in all, or virtually all, of its applications”), vacated, 
552 U.S. 1306 (2008). 
 116. Pruitt, 502 F.3d at 1171 (McConnell, J., concurring). 
 117. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (quoting Fallon, supra note 114, at 
1328); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006) 
(“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to limit the 
solution to the problem. We prefer, for example, to enjoin only the unconstitutional applications 
of a statute while leaving other applications in force . . . .”). 
 118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960) (“The very 
foundation of the power of the federal courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitutional lies in 
the power and duty of those courts to decide cases and controversies properly before them.”); 
Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Comm’rs of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885) 
(holding courts must “adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies”). 
 119. Kreit, supra note 41, at 660 (noting the Court’s shift in favor of as-applied challenges in 
abortion cases); Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 IND. L.J. 1557, 
1557–58 (2010) (“[T]he cases cited as evidence for the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied 
challenges all involve constitutional challenges which concede the legislative power to enact the 
provision but nevertheless argue for unconstitutionality because the statute intrudes upon rights or 
liberties protected by the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and  
As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 784 (2009) (“This 
overview of the Roberts Court’s recent jurisprudence establishes both the frequency with which 
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abortion rights and First Amendment rights.120  In Washington State Grange v. 
Washington State Republican Party, the Court considered a facial challenge to 
a Washington state law that argued that the law violated associational rights 
protected by the First Amendment.121  Finding that the law “does not on its 
face severely burden respondents’ associational rights,” the Court rejected the 
facial constitutional challenge.122  Similarly, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court 
found that a facial challenge to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003 “should not have been entertained in the first instance.”123  Rather, the 
Court held that “the proper means to consider exceptions [to the law] is by [an] 
as-applied challenge,” which the Court defined as a “discrete and well-defined 
instance[] [that] has or is likely to occur.”124  Lower courts seemingly have 
taken notice of this trend, and appellate court decisions have increasingly 
distinguished between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges while 
noting a preference for the latter.125 
II.  SKF AND OTHER BYRD AMENDMENT CHALLENGES 
A.  SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection: The Federal Circuit 
Holds the Byrd Amendment Constitutional Under Free-Speech and Equal-
Protection Rubrics 
SKF USA is a domestic producer of antifriction steel bearings that opposed 
a 1988 dumping petition via a questionnaire.126  As a result, when SKF USA 
requested affected-domestic-producer status in 2005, it was denied.127  SKF 
USA subsequently challenged the Byrd Amendment in the CIT, alleging that 
                                                
that Court has emphasized the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges and its 
preference for the latter as a mode for constitutional rights litigation.”). 
 120. Metzger, supra note 119, at 774 n.2 (“[T]he Roberts Court has rejected facial challenges 
asserting violations of abortion and First Amendment rights, two contexts in which facial 
challenges were previously often accepted.”); see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 444 (2008) (First Amendment rights); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (abortion rights). 
 121. 552 U.S. at 444. 
 122. Id. at 458–59. 
 123. 550 U.S. at 167. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“A facial challenge to a statute or regulation is independent of the individual bringing the 
complaint and the circumstances surrounding his or her challenge. . . . In contrast, an as-applied 
challenge is specific to the facts of the particular individual involved in the suit.” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 529–30 
(6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s preference for as-applied challenges in the 
context of a Fourth Amendment claim). 
 126. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 127. Id. at 1358. 
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the Byrd Amendment was facially unconstitutional because it “discriminat[ed] 
between similarly situated domestic producers” in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.128  Faced with an equal-protection challenge subject to 
rational-basis scrutiny,129 the CIT first came to the determination that the Byrd 
Amendment discriminated between similarly situated domestic producers 
based on whether they supported the original AD/CVD petition.130  Then, the 
court turned to whether there was any legitimate government purpose to 
support the discrimination.131  Viewing the Byrd Amendment in light of its 
legislative history and intent,132 the court concluded that the Byrd 
Amendment’s purpose was to help domestic industries as a whole, and not 
each domestic producer as an individual entity.133  Therefore, the court found 
the Byrd Amendment’s distinction between individual producers 
“incongruous” with this purpose, and ultimately sustained SKF USA’s facial 
equal-protection challenge.134   
A divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed on appeal, 
and found the Byrd Amendment constitutional based on the First Amendment 
right to free speech.135  In conducting the free-speech analysis, the court 
likened the Byrd Amendment’s support provision to cases that involved 
commercial speech and necessitated an intermediate form of scrutiny requiring 
a “substantial government interest.”136  The court found that the government 
had a substantial interest in rewarding parties who promoted the government’s 
policy of preventing dumping and subsidization.137  Because the Byrd 
                     
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1360.  The court noted that because the Byrd Amendment falls under “areas of 
social and economic policy” it is subject to this lower standard of scrutiny.  Id. 
 130. Id. (“As the CDSOA is applied here, similarly situated entities, i.e. SKF and Timken, 
are treated differently and thus, do not stand equal before the law.”). 
 131. Id. at 1361. 
 132. Id.  The court also focused on the Byrd Amendment’s congruence with previous trade 
laws.  Id. at 1362 (noting that the Byrd Amendment altered previous trade laws and “should be 
read in congruity with the other provisions therein”). 
 133. Id. at 1361–62 (“[CDSOA is] designed to ensure that domestic industries, not any 
individual company [can] compete in the marketplace.”). 
 134. Id. at 1361, 1363. 
 135. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009).  On appeal, SKF USA advanced a First Amendment free speech theory, rather than 
equal protection, as its primary argument.  Id. at 1349.  Under this theory, for the law to be upheld 
under free-speech doctrines, the court would have to find that it was narrowly tailored to a  
substantial-government interest.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 792. 
 136. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1354–55 (noting that the Supreme Court’s commercial-speech 
jurisprudence calls for an intermediate form of scrutiny, as opposed to strict scrutiny applied 
under a traditional free-speech analysis). 
 137. Id. at 1352.  The CAFC’s purpose determination is a substantial deviation from the 
CIT’s earlier findings.  Compare id. (finding that the purpose of the Byrd Amendment was to 
reward parties who reported unfair foreign-trade practices), with SKF I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 
(finding that the purpose of the Byrd Amendment was to help domestic industries as a  
whole— not any individual producer—recover from unfair foreign-trade practices). 
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Amendment survived a facial First Amendment challenge, the court concluded 
that it easily survived a less rigorous rational-basis scrutiny under  
equal-protection analysis.138  The Supreme Court denied certiorari; thus, the 
Federal Circuit’s holding in SKF currently controls similar pending and future 
Byrd Amendment cases.139 
However, the Federal Circuit has signaled its willingness to reconsider a 
constitutional challenge to the Byrd Amendment. For example, Judge Richard 
Linn’s SKF II dissent strongly contested the majority’s holding and explained 
that “[t]he majority errs by . . . graft[ing] its ‘reward’ purpose onto the statute, 
when that purpose is not apparent in the statutory text or legislative history and 
has been expressly disclaimed by the government in this case.”140  Even the 
SKF II majority left open the possibility that a future plaintiff that had shown 
support, but failed to make a formal expression, could be eligible for Byrd 
money under the court’s construction of the affected-domestic-producer 
provision.141  The court also indicated in PS Chez Sidney that SKF would 
control for the constitutional issues presented in that particular case, but that its 
opinion could not to be used as a precedential holding in future cases.142  These 
factors suggest that the Federal Circuit may be willing to reconsider a future 
constitutional challenge to the Byrd Amendment.143  
B.  Survey of Other Byrd Amendment Challengers: Factually Distinguishable 
from SKF Plaintiffs 
In the wake of SKF, remaining Byrd Amendment challengers whose cases 
were stayed pending the outcome of SKF and other test cases will now have an 
opportunity to be heard.144  Challengers will undoubtedly focus on the strength 
of their factual case and attempt to distinguish themselves from the plaintiffs in 
                     
 138. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1360. 
 139. SKF USA, Inc. v. Customs & Border Prot., 130 S. Ct. 3273, 3273 (2010); PS Chez 
Sidney, L.L.C. v. United States, No. 2008-1526, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22584, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 
Oct. 28, 2010) (“SKF is controlling with regard to all constitutional issues presented in this 
appeal.”); see also Supreme Court Declines to Review Ruling in Byrd Amendment Case, supra 
note 31, at 10 (stating that SKF was the test case for nearly fifty similar Byrd Amendment cases). 
 140. SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1361 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 1353 (“The language of the Byrd Amendment is easily susceptible to a 
construction that rewards actions (litigation support) rather than the expression of particular 
views.”); see also infra note 159 and accompanying text (advancing the argument of Giorgio 
Foods that this particular language supports their position). 
 142. PS Chez Sidney, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22584, at *3.  But see id. at *1 (noting that the 
decision “MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENT”). 
 143. On rehearing en banc, a divided court again denied SKF USA’s appeal; however, four 
members of the court, including now-Chief Judge Randall Rader and Judge Richard Linn, 
strongly dissented.  SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF III), 583 F.3d 1340, 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 144. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining that many cases were stayed 
pending the outcomes of SKF and other Byrd test cases that have since been resolved). 
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SKF, who actively opposed the underlying antidumping petition.145  United 
Synthetics, Inc. v. United States, involving a domestic producer of polyester 
staple fiber suing to get its share of collected duties under the Byrd 
Amendment,146 is one example of the many cases in which a stay was recently 
lifted.147  In 2000, Commerce issued an antidumping-duty order on polyester 
staple fiber from Korea and Taiwan after receiving a petition from certain 
domestic producers claiming injury.148  Five days after Commerce issued the 
antidumping order, United Synthetics, Inc. (USI) began operating as a U.S. 
manufacturer of polyester staple fiber.149  The Byrd Amendment came into 
effect months later.150  In 2007, USI requested to be added to the list of 
affected domestic producers, but was subsequently denied “because it did not 
support the original petitions.”151  Unlike the plaintiffs in SKF, USI did not 
exist at the time that Commerce issued the original antidumping order; 
therefore, USI lacked the opportunity to show the requisite support for the 
petition.152  
Another plaintiff, Giorgio Foods, Inc., is a domestic producer of preserved 
mushrooms that “took no position with respect to the petition,” on the ITC’s 
questionnaire, but did take “numerous actions to support the petition and its 
filing.”153  In the aftermath of SKF, Giorgio’s arguments have relied on dicta in 
the Federal Circuit’s decision, which indicate that a producer who showed 
support outside of a support letter or questionnaire could be eligible for Byrd 
money.154  In comparison, SKF USA and similar Byrd Amendment challengers 
were mostly producers that demonstrated actual opposition to AD/CVD 
petitions by checking the “no support” or “take no position” boxes on ITC 
                     
 145. See SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rossella Brevetti, Shrimp Producers Raise Constitutional Claims on 
Application of Byrd Law, INT’L TRADE DAILY, June 10, 2011 (discussing a post-SKF claim in 
which the plaintiffs argued “that its constitutional claims [were] ‘fundamentally different’ from 
those rejected in the SKF decision”). 
 146. Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 1–4. 
 147. See Letter from Gregory W. Carman, supra note 31 (“[T]he Court will entertain 
questions pertaining to scheduling resulting from the lifting of the stays in these cases.”). 
 148. Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 7–8. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 8. 
 151. Id. at 9–10. 
 152. Id. at 4, 7–8. 
 153. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8, 13. 
 154. Id. at 4 (“Under SKF, to avoid First Amendment free speech problems that otherwise 
would exist, the petition support requirement must be construed such that eligibility for 
distributions is based on ‘actions (litigation support) rather than the expression of particular 
views.’” (citations omitted)). 
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questionnaires.155  Therefore, plaintiffs who have a more favorable factual 
situation argue that their claim should not be foreclosed by the outcome in 
SKF. 
III.  SKF SHOULD NOT FORECLOSE FUTURE AS-APPLIED EQUAL-PROTECTION 
CHALLENGES TO THE BYRD AMENDMENT 
A.  SKF Bars Only Facial Challenges to the Byrd Amendment 
SKF appears to foreclose any facial constitutional challenge to the Byrd 
Amendment both with regard to equal protection and free speech, which 
requires pending challengers to rely on as-applied arguments to procure 
possible distributions.156  The Byrd Amendment’s affected-domestic-producer 
provision requires that a domestic producer show support for the underlying 
AD/CVD petition in order to receive payouts from the duties imposed.157  
When analyzing SKF USA’s challenge, the Federal Circuit considered whether 
the Byrd Amendment’s discrimination against a producer who actively 
opposed the petition was related to a substantial government interest.158  
Despite its holding that the Byrd Amendment survived a facial constitutional 
challenge, both under free-speech and equal-protection doctrines, the Federal 
Circuit has signaled that it may reconsider a constitutional challenge to the 
Byrd Amendment.159  In considering an as-applied analysis, the Federal Circuit 
must take note of the Supreme Court’s increasing preference for as-applied 
challenges in individual-rights litigation.160  Specifically, the Supreme Court 
has held that an as-applied challenge may be sustained where a facial challenge 
has failed.161  With this guidance, the Federal Circuit should reconsider a 
future Byrd Amendment challenger’s equal-protection claim as applied to that 
individual producer.162  These challengers, whose factual situations differ 
                     
 155. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1357–58, 1363 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2006) (describing SKF USA as a domestic producer that opposed the original petition, and 
was therefore denied Byrd Amendment funds), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also PS Chez Sidney, L.L.C. v. U.S. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1331, 1333–34 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) (describing PS 
Chez Sidney as a domestic producer that checked the “[t]ake no position” box on the final 
petition, and was therefore denied Byrd money), rev’d, No. 2008-1526, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22584 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 28, 2010). 
 156. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007) (finding that an as-applied 
constitutional challenge may be upheld where a previous facial challenge has failed); supra Part 
I.B.2.b (describing the increasing preference of the Roberts Court for as-applied challenges in 
individual-rights litigation). 
 157. See supra Part I.A.3.a. 
 158. See SKF II, 556 F.3d at 1355. 
 159. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 161. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 162. See supra Part II.B. 
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significantly from SKF USA’s, have a stronger claim that could survive 
rational-basis scrutiny.163   
As a test case, SKF USA’s claim was arguably easy to defeat; the plaintiffs 
did not support the underlying petition, rather, they clearly opposed the petition 
by checking the “no support” box on the ITC’s questionnaire. 164  Plaintiffs that 
have supported the petition by other means, but failed to express outright 
support—such as Giorgio Foods—have a stronger claim than SKF USA.165  
Similarly, plaintiffs that were denied an opportunity to show support because 
they were not in existence at the filing of the original petition—such as  
USI—have a stronger claim than SKF USA.166  As these differences are 
extremely significant, future Byrd Amendment challengers should not be 
bound by the CAFC’s SKF holding.167 
B.  Equal-Protection Challenges Should Be Reconsidered 
Many previously stayed Byrd Amendment cases are currently pending 
before the CIT.168  In light of the Supreme Court jurisprudence noted above, 
these cases should not be controlled by SKF, and instead could be vehicles for 
sustaining successful as-applied equal-protection claims against the Byrd 
Amendment.  In analyzing an as-applied equal-protection challenge to the 
Byrd Amendment, the court must undertake several steps to determine: (1) the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply—strict, intermediate, or rational basis, 2) 
the purpose of the Byrd Amendment and its effect on a particular producer, 
and 3) whether the appropriate level of scrutiny is met.169   
The CIT will likely find that an as-applied equal-protection claim is 
reviewable under a rational-basis standard  because there is no violation of a 
fundamental right or discrimination of some suspect class; this would trigger a 
heightened form of scrutiny.170  In addition, because the Byrd Amendment falls 
under the scope of economic policy—albeit international—it is subject to a 
                     
 163. See supra Part II.B. 
 164. SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2006), rev’d sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 165. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 8, 13. 
 166. See Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 6–7. 
 167. See supra Part II.B. 
 168. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 169. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 93, at 674 (outlining steps taken by a court in an equal 
protection analysis); supra Part I.B.1.b. 
 170. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that a statute 
that burdens a fundamental right or targets a suspect class requires some heightened form of 
scrutiny); SKF USA, Inc. v. United States (SKF I), 451 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1357–58 (Ct. Int’l 
Trade 2006) (reviewing SKF USA’s equal-protection claim under rational-basis scrutiny), rev’d 
sub nom. SKF USA, Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (SKF II), 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
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lower standard of scrutiny.171  Under rational-basis review, the court must 
determine whether the alleged discrimination caused by the Byrd Amendment 
is rationally related to the purpose of the law.172  In discerning a purpose, the 
court may accept any conceivable justification for the law, and therefore does 
not confine the inquiry to the Byrd Amendment’s text, legislative history, or 
intent alone.173 
With such a low standard of review, the court must acknowledge the 
tremendous burden any plaintiff must overcome to prove the Byrd Amendment 
unconstitutional on equal-protection grounds.174  As noted previously, there is 
a constitutional presumption that even the most “improvident decisions will 
eventually be rectified by the democratic process.”175  Arguably, in this 
instance, the democratic process played its intended role as the legislation was 
repealed in 2006.176  However, this presumption does not render a  
rational-basis review completely moot; numerous courts have found laws 
unconstitutional under equal protection using this standard.177 
As in SKF, there is no question before the court that the Byrd Amendment’s 
affected-domestic-producer provision as applied to certain plaintiffs 
discriminates between similarly situated domestic producers.178  For example, 
USI is a domestic producer in an industry that is currently experiencing 
negative effects from continued dumping, despite a long-standing antidumping 
                     
 171. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“When social or economic legislation is at issue, the 
Equal Protection Clause allows the [government] wide latitude.” (citations omitted)); SKF I, 451 
F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (noting that the Byrd Amendment falls under the scope of social and 
economic policy and should be reviewed under a lower, rational-basis standard). 
 172. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citing that under a rational-basis review, 
the alleged discrimination must be rationally related to some legitimate government purpose). 
 173. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (“A statutory discrimination will 
not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”). 
 174. See, e.g., SKF I, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1362 (acknowledging the burden in establishing that 
the Byrd Amendment unconstitutionally violates the Equal Protection Clause under rational-basis 
scrutiny). 
 175. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (footnote omitted); see also supra Part 
I.B.1.b. (outlining this presumption toward constitutionality under a rational-basis review). 
 176. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154 (2005) 
(repealing Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, § 1675c). 
 177. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (finding that a state constitutional amendment denying 
homosexuals protection violated equal-protection principles under rational-basis scrutiny); 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding that a law denying 
permission for the establishment of a group home for the mentally handicapped violated  
equal-protection doctrines under rational-basis scrutiny). 
 178. See Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c, repealed 
by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 154–55 (2005) (explaining 
that only domestic producers that affirmatively demonstrated specific support for a petition are 
considered affected domestic producers eligible for Byrd Amendment distributions); SKF I, 451 
F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (noting the affected-domestic-producer provision treats similarly situated 
domestic producers differently); supra Part I.A.3.a (exploring the details of the  
affected-domestic-producer provision). 
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order.179  Some of USI’s domestic competitors that supported the original 
antidumping petition are eligible for Byrd Amendment distributions.180  And 
yet, because USI was not in existence at the time of the original petition, it is 
deemed ineligible.181  Similarly, Giorgio Foods checked the “take no position” 
box on the ITC questionnaire, although it did support the petition by other 
means.182  Thus, Giorgio was deemed ineligible for Byrd money, while its 
domestic competitors that did not provide as much support, but did check the 
“support” box were eligible.183  Therefore, because challengers can easily 
establish discrimination, the court must also consider whether there is any 
legitimate purpose rationally related this injury.184 
In determining a legitimate government purpose behind the Byrd 
Amendment, the CIT could potentially repeat its finding from SKF I.185  
According to the CIT in that case, congressional statements and  
findings—when read in congruence with previous trade laws—indicate that the 
Byrd Amendment was meant to assist the whole domestic industry in 
recovering from unfair foreign-trade practices.186  In its analysis, the court 
could highlight that the Byrd Amendment expands traditional trade-remedy 
law, by seeking to remedy not only past harm to a domestic industry, but also 
injury from continued dumping or subsidization past the date of an order’s 
imposition.187  To promote this purpose, it follows that distributions under the 
Byrd Amendment should be made to every member of an affected domestic 
industry that claims injury due to continued dumping or subsidization—not 
just those individual producers that happened to support the original order.  
With this purpose in mind, the court must then ask if the discrimination 
effectuated by the Byrd Amendment is rationally related to that purpose.188  In 
USI’s case, the distinguishing factor that renders it ineligible for Byrd 
Amendment distributions is its lack of existence at the time of the original 
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petition.189  In line with previous equal-protection jurisprudence, this arbitrary 
distinction is irrational in relation to the overall purposes of the Byrd 
Amendment, especially when read in conjunction with previous trade laws.190  
In support of this conclusion, the CIT would have to look no further than the 
Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Moreno—one of the few times the Court 
has held that a law violates equal-protection principles under a rational-basis 
review.191  In Moreno, the Court found that a later-in-time provision of the 
Food Stamp Act that discriminated against the indigent population was 
“clearly irrelevant” to the stated purposes of the Act in its entirety—to provide 
relief to that particular subgroup.192  Likewise, the Byrd Amendment 
discriminates against the very population that trade laws seek to protect and 
compensate: injured domestic industries.193  By viewing the Byrd Amendment 
as an amendment to these previous laws, the CIT could find that aiding certain 
domestic producers that were in existence at the time of the original  
petition—over other similarly situated domestic producers that were not in 
existence—is in direct opposition to the overall purpose of those laws.194  
Thus, the Byrd Amendment is not rationally related to this legitimate 
government purpose, and so violates USI’s right to equal protection under a 
rational-basis review.  
The CIT could also look to the Federal Circuit’s holding in SKF II, which 
determined that the Byrd Amendment’s legitimate purpose was to reward 
parties who promoted the government’s policy interest in preventing 
dumping.195  The Federal Circuit may have been averse to rewarding SKF 
USA because SKF USA originally opposed the dumping petition, which had 
been supported by other domestic producers.196  Unlike SKF USA, USI did not 
exist at the time of the petition.197  Producers like USI, therefore, have an even 
more compelling case than SKF USA—they never had the opportunity to 
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support the petition, much less “promote the government’s policy interest 
against dumping.”  Thus, the “reward” purpose has no bearing on producers 
that were not yet in existence at the time the original petition was at issue.198  
Because of this and other critical fact differences, the CIT could distinguish the 
Federal Circuit’s holding in SKF, and find that the Byrd Amendment is a 
violation of a future plaintiff’s right to equal protection under the law. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Despite its repeal in 2006, the Byrd Amendment continues to attract 
criticism for its international trade implications and constitutional effects.  
Although the Federal Circuit found the Byrd Amendment survived a facial 
constitutional challenge under free-speech and equal-protection challenges, 
this should not foreclose future Byrd Amendment challenges.  Rather, courts 
should review the constitutionality of the Byrd Amendment as applied to each 
new plaintiff.  The Supreme Court’s recent preference for adjudicating 
challenges as applied rather than facially in individual-rights litigation supports 
this policy.  Furthermore, significant factual differences between SKF USA 
and future plaintiffs compel an individual assessment of constitutionality as 
applied to the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.  Therefore, despite facial 
validity, a court reviewing an as-applied equal-protection claim could find the 
Byrd Amendment unconstitutional as a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s right to equal protection. 
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